Older People in the Platform Economy by Berde, Éva
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 18 February 2019
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2019.00008
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2019 | Volume 4 | Article 8
Edited by:
Andrzej Klimczuk,
Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
Reviewed by:
Massomeh Hajilee,
University of Houston Victoria,
United States
Andrew Edgar,
Cardiff University, United Kingdom
*Correspondence:
Eva Berde
eva.berde@uni-corvinus.hu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Sociological Theory,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Sociology
Received: 24 October 2018
Accepted: 28 January 2019
Published: 18 February 2019
Citation:
Berde E (2019) Older People in the
Platform Economy. Front. Sociol. 4:8.
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2019.00008
Older People in the Platform
Economy
Eva Berde 1,2*
1Department of Microeconomics, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary, 2Demography and Economics
Research Centre, Corvinus School of Economics, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
Since the platform economies have emerged, there are many new ways how people can
perform earning activities. These new opportunities concern older people too. However,
some authors write that the actors of the platform economy are mainly younger people
and it is not typical that older people work through platforms. We cite the opposite case of
Oszkar (Hungarian On-line Passenger Intermediary System) where the ratio of older (55+)
drivers to the total number of chauffeurs increased in time. At the same time, 30–40%
of all drivers do not declare their age. In our paper, we analyse why older people do not
declare their age. Using the results of our online survey and a Bayesian game theoretic
model we prove that in the equilibrium state older people are frequently against letting
others know their real age when they apply to work through a platform. We think that
the cause is still existing age discrimination
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INTRODUCTION
Increased longevity, and at the same time, greater healthy life expectancy makes it possible to work
for a longer time as well. However, in the majority of European welfare states up until the mid-
1980s older generations could enjoy the comfort and relative material well-being of retirement at
a comparatively early age. It was generally accepted that it was the “duty” of older people to retire
and make room in the workplace for young people.
An extreme example is the “Walmart effect,” described by Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2007),
wherebymanagement sought to replace even themiddle-aged bymore efficient younger workforce.
Starting from the end of the 1980s retirement age in most European countries began to rise,
and governments tried to popularize the value of older people’s labor. PwC (2018) using their
famous Golden Age Index—which calculates the percentage of 55–64 year old active in the labor
market—estimated that in the year 2017 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries would have been higher by
$3.5 trillion if they had managed to keep all older adults on the labor market until they reached
retirement age. The government’s intent, however, is frustrated not only by older people’s lack of
ambition but also by beliefs ingrained in society, as well as corporate level strategies.
In our paper, we examine a particular manifestation of societal beliefs. Our first hypothesis
states that older people suffer—or at least they feel that they suffer—negative discrimination not
only when applying for traditional jobs, but also when they seek work using online platforms. Our
second hypothesis states that older people adapt to these conditions and either misrepresent or do
not declare their age.
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The beginning of the whole story was when we saw the data
analysis from the Hungarian carpooling platform Oszkar1 in
Berde and Tokes (2018), which shows that on average 30–40%
of the chauffeurs using the service do not enter their age on their
profile. Of course, this does not mean that only older people omit
their age. It is likely that others, especially the very young, do the
same. Also, Berde and Tokes (2018) show that contrary to the
claim of Huws et al. (2017) older adults do like to use online
platforms to look for work. At least in the case of Oszkar, the
ratio of drivers aged 55 years or more has increased while the
total number of drivers was increasing as well. Thus, how older
people behave while they seek work on online platforms may be
a question of particular importance.
We prove our hypothesis, concerning the omission of age on
profiles, by way of an online survey. The description of the survey
is in the second part of our article, where we present its results as
well. In the third part, we use a well-known game-theoretic model
to support further our argument that older adults may feel the
need not to disclose their age. Finally, we conclude our findings.
THE ONLINE SURVEY
Our online survey consists of five questions. The full text of the
survey can be found in the Appendix. Respondents were first
asked their year of birth and gender. Then we inquired if they
believed when someone was thinking about using the services
they offered through an online platform (e.g., chauffeuring
services, tutoring, cleaning) the prospective clients would take
their age into consideration. The next question asked whether
respondents would enter their age on the platform if it was
possible, but not mandatory. Lastly, if they chose to enter age,
we asked what it would be.
We propagated the online survey on special mailing lists
and Facebook groups where most participants were more than
50 years old, sometimes significantly older. Links to the survey
were distributed in June 2018 and responses were collected until
the end of August 2018. We got 140 responses. The youngest
responder was 24-year-old, the oldest 78-year-old. For the sake
of uniformity, we removed those under the age of 50 from
the sample, thereby retaining 131 responses for evaluation. The
distribution of the answers in the remaining sample is shown in
Table 1 below.
From the figures of Table 1, it is important to highlight that in
our sample 45% of people older than 50 would not voluntarily
declare their true age on their profile. It is also interesting to
note that 19% of respondents think their age would not matter
when someone is considering engaging their services. All such
respondents would declare their real age on their profile.
Only five of the respondents said that they would declare an
age lower than their true age—albeit only by a few years—in order
to seem younger. They represent merely 3.82% of the sample.
Therefore, we decided not to put these people into a separate
category for our analysis, but instead group them with the people
1Upon its founding in 2007 Oszkar was basically a carpooling service. Based
on Oszkar.hu’s present day data Berde and Tokes (2018) have concluded that
commercial postings have become an ever-increasing majority.
TABLE 1 | Distribution of answers in the 131 responses submitted by people over
the age of 50.
Gender Female: 59.54% Male: 40.46%
Displayed age would affect the
number of clients who order
your service
Yes: 80.92% No: 19.08%
Declare true age on profile Declare: 54.96% Do not declare:
45.04%
Among those who do not think
age matters with respect to the
number of clients, declare true
age on the profile
Declare: 100%
Among those who think age
matters with respect to the
number of clients, declare true
age on the profile
Declare: 44.34% Do not declare:
55.66%
who declared their real age. Using the survey results we rejected
our previous belief that older adults will try to misrepresent their
age when offering services2.
Our online survey cannot be considered representative since
it was disseminated in a particular way. Belonging to an online
mailing list or a Facebook group constitutes self-screening. Our
survey does show however that older adults do think age is a
significant factor in whether their offered services are engaged or
not. In the next part of our study, we use the results of our survey
to show that in a Bayesian game such as the one presented by Cho
and Kreps (1987) and Kreps (1990) older adults may similarly
attempt to hide their age.
THE MODEL
The Background of Our Model
Our model uses two theoretical game concepts, both classic by
present day standards. The first one is job market signaling, the
second is the transformation of games of incomplete information
into games of imperfect information. The concept of job market
signaling was first introduced by Spence (1978). In this concept,
the employer offers a contract, wherein the wage paid is
conditional on the level of education the employee can certify.
However, the employee’s level of competence is only known to
them, and is not necessarily reflected by their qualifications.
A less competent person with a college degree may garner
a higher salary than a similarly competent person without a
college degree. Though signaling was applied to the job market
directly in Spence (1978), similar ideas are formulated in Arrow
(1973), Mincer (1974), and Stiglitz (1975). Since the seminal
work of Spence, signaling is one of the most frequently used
tools when studying employee contracts. Some frequently cited
applications are Lazear and Rosen (1981), Hanushek (1986),
Heckman et al. (2006), and Slee (2017). Of these, Slee (2017)
offers the conclusionsmost relevant to our subject. Slee points out
that the rating systems of gig economy jobs performed through
online platforms make it seem as though the people performing
2We did not consider how likely it is that someone who would lie would also admit
that they would lie. Maybe they wish to hide their mistrustful behavior.
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the job have been rated objectively, based on the quality of
their work. However, in real life these ratings may contain even
more prejudice than conventional ratings given by supervisors.
Workers in the gig economy are compelled to send signals that
counter this prejudice, so they get better ratings (e.g., they may
try to hide the fact that they belong to a local ethnic minority).
Information sets can be used in situations when some players
are aware of a specific piece of information but others are
not. This piece of information is sometimes referred to as the
type of player who is aware of it. This may be their age, level
of competence, etc. Harsanyi (1967; 1968a; 1968b) has shown
how to transform games of incomplete information into games
of imperfect information, by introducing “Chance” as the first
mover. “Chance” has no payoffs, but it determines the types of
the players. Players may signal their type via actions. e.g., in the
Spence (1978) model the more competent people may complete
their university education with less effort, and are therefore more
likely to get a degree. However, a player may try to signal a type
different from their own, and this may increase their payoff, as
with the less competent person with a degree in the previous
example. The other player can only form a belief about the type
based on the signal received, so all types with the same signal
fall into the same information set. The job market is modeled
using this technique in Roth and Sotomayor (1992). Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994) also contains applications of the Harsanyi
transformation, where in addition they emphasize the role of
outside circumstances. They also say that the circumstances
depend on the behavior of the players, and conversely the
behavior of the players depends on the circumstances too. Our
own model, introduced below, is built upon the same principles.
The Structure of the Model and Its Results
In our model, there are two types of older adults’ chauffeurs for
hire. The first type thinks his age does not matter; the clients will
engage his services regardless of his age.We denote this type by R,
short for “Regardless.” The second type believes that age matters
to the clients and older chauffeurs get fewer engagements. We
denote this type by M, short for “Matters.” In order to offer their
services, both types register on an online platform, where they
fill out a data sheet. It is not required to answer all questions.
Specifically, it is notmandatory to declare their age. In reality, this
is not verified by the platform, hence misrepresentation is also
possible, but in our model, we do not consider this possibility.
The only options are declaring their real age or not declaring any
age at all.
Of course, passengers are more likely to meet young
chauffeurs than old chauffeurs, but we restrict ourselves to this
latter case. When the potential passenger encounters a posting by
the chauffeur, they either engage their services, or they do not.
One piece of information used by the passenger to make this
decision is the age of the chauffeur. However, this may bemissing.
In this case, the passenger does not know why the chauffeur
did not declare their age; it may be because they are too old, or
they may have simply glossed over it when they filled out the
data sheet.
The payoffs are similar to the ones in the game presented
by Cho and Kreps (1987). Passengers receive a payoff of 1 if
they interact with the old chauffeur according to their type. In
our model, this means engaging the services of those who think
they will be hired regardless of their age, and not engaging the
services of those who think their agematters. If passengers choose
the wrong action, they receive a payoff of 0. We summarize
passengers’ payoffs below:
Engage services of type R: 1.
Do not engage services of type R: 0.
Engage services of type M: 0.
Do not engage services of type M: 1.
However, the passenger cannot directly observe the type of the
chauffeur. They can only observe if they have declared their age
or if they have not. Declaring their age is a signal sent by the
chauffeur, which yields a type dependent direct payoff, and it
may influence the passenger’s decision as well. We summarize the
direct payoffs of drivers from their signal: Type R and declares
age: 1.
TypeM and declares age: 0.
Type R and does not declare age: 0.
TypeM and does not declare age: 1.
The chauffeurs’ payoff depends more on whether or not the
passengers engage their services. The chauffeurs’ payoffs resulting
from the passenger’s decision are given below:
Services are engaged:
Services are not engaged: 0.
Based on the previous payoffs, the payoff of the type R chauffeurs,
if they declare their age and their services are engaged by the
passenger, is 3. If they declare their age, but their services are not
engaged, their payoff is 1. If they do not declare their age, but their
services are engaged, they receive a payoff of 2. If they do not
declare their age and their services are not engaged their payoff
is 0. The payoff of the type M chauffeur is similarly addictive. If
type M drivers declare their age and their services are engaged,
they get a payoff of 2. However, if they do not declare their age
and their services are not engaged, they get a lower payoff, 1.
Therefore, if declaring their age canmove the passenger to engage
their services, it is worthwhile to do so, even though this goes
against the character of the typeM chauffeur.
Now we proceed to determine the equilibrium of our Bayesian
game based on Cho and Kreps (1987) using the reasoning
presented in Binmore (1992). The starting player is Chance,
who decides the type of the chauffeur with exogenously given
probabilities. Based on the results of our survey, in our game, the
probability of type Rwill be 19.8%. The game has no pure strategy
equilibrium [For a detailed proof see Binmore (1992) page 464,
figure 10.11. In that example, the probabilities differ from ours,
but the same calculations prove that in our game there is no pure
strategy equilibrium either]. Since we are dealing with a game of
incomplete information, we will use the Harsanyi transformation
to make it into a game of imperfect information and solve that.
This is why we introduce Chance as the starting player. We
denote the probability that type R drivers do not declare their
age by NG (None Given), and we denote the probability that
they declare their age by D (Declare). Of course, NG+D = 1.
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In the case of type M, the same probabilities are denoted by ng
and d, respectively.
The passenger, as we have already stated, can only observe
the signal sent by the chauffeur, that is whether or not the
chauffeur has declared their age. Both in the “Declare” and the
“None Given” information sets the passengers will only engage
the chauffeur’s services if they believe the chauffeur has a higher
probability of being type R than of being typeM.
In the “None Given” information set services are engaged i
0.198NG
0.198NG+ 0.802ng
>
0.802ng
0.198NG+ 0.802ng
(1)
that is if NG > 4.05ng.
Services are not engaged if NG < 4.05ng (2)
In order for the passenger to randomize we must have
NG = 4.05ng (3)
Therefore
1− D = 4.05− 4.05d (4)
which yields
4.05d = 3.05+ D (5)
In the “Declare” information set services are engaged if
0.198D
0.198D+ 0.802d
>
0.802d
0.198D+ 0.802d
(6)
that is if
D > 4.05d (7)
Services are not engaged if
D < 4.05d. (8)
Based on (5, 8) if the passenger randomizes in the “None Given”
information set, they will not engage services in the “Declare”
information set. Thus, type M will not declare their age, as that
would mean ng = 1, and together with (3) it would imply NG =
4.05, which is impossible.
This means that the only mixed equilibrium is such that the
passenger randomizes in the “Declare” information set.
D = 4.05d (9)
This means that
1− NG = 4.05− 4.05ng (10)
NG = 4.05ng − 3.05 (11)
NG < 4.05ng (12)
thus services are not engaged in the “None Given” information
set. Therefore, type R will always declare their age, so D = 1 and
based on (9) d = 0.2469. This shows that typeM will randomize
between the “None given” and “Declare” behavioral strategies.
In case of “None given,” type M receives a payoff of 1, and his
expected payoffmust be the same when he chooses “Declare.” Let
us denote the probability that services are engaged in the “None
given” information set by θ . TypeM will randomize if
1 = 0+ 2θ (13)
which yields
θ =
1
2
(14)
Thus, type R chauffeurs will always declare their age, while type
M chauffeurs will declare their age with probability 0.2469. In the
“None Given” information set the passengers will never engage
the chauffeur’s services, while in the “Declare” information set
they will do so with probability 0.5.
According to our survey, less than half of the M type
chauffeurs would declare their age. Our game theoretical model
based on Cho and Kreps (1987) yields an even lower ratio,
although this clearly depends on the exact numerical values in the
payoff function. The order of these values is essential: If a type
M chauffeur does not declare their age, they get a lower payoff
than if they do declare their age and as a result, their services are
engaged. This is in accordance with the results of our survey even
though 81% of the respondents thought that age matters, 44% of
them would still declare their age despite their misgivings.
CONCLUSIONS
Due to the small number of observations and to the self-screening
in the online groups used to propagate our questions, the survey
cannot be considered representative, but it does provide clear
guidance about whether people think age matters. The high ratio
of affirmative answers allows us to conclude that most old people
feel that there is age discrimination in the labor market of the
platforms. This result is further supported by our model based on
Cho and Kreps (1987). We also demonstrated both by the survey
and the model, that people recognize society’s attitude toward
older adults, and in order to be successful in the platform, they
adjust their behavior accordingly.
All this confirms that the situation is similar to the one
described in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). The behavior
of older chauffeurs is affected by their environment. Those
who think their age matters when considering to offer their
services frequently do not reveal their age. These chauffeurs
probably formed their beliefs after previous negative experiences.
However, by omitting their birth year they decrease the ratio
of older chauffeurs who have admitted their real age. This may
reaffirm the public’s belief that older chauffeurs are less capable
drivers, and hence their services should not be engaged.
This creates a vicious cycle. It is very difficult to change
underlying attitudes. Our results call attention to the fact that in
order to lengthen labor market participation mere governmental
intent will not suffice. To be able to retain older adults longer a
shift in societal attitude is required as well.
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APPENDIX
Questions of the online survey (translated from Hungarian)
1. What is your gender?
- Female
- Male
2. Year of birth
3. The image that you are advertising service through an online
platform. E.g., tutoring, chauffeuring services, cleaning, etc.
When you register on the platform you may enter your age,
but this is not verified by anyone so that you can omit this
declaration. Do you think your age will affect the number of
your clients?
- It will
- It will not
4. Would you enter (any) year of birth?
- I would probably not.
- I probably would
5. What year of birth would you enter? In case you answered, “I
would probably not.” in the previous question, write zero (0)
now. Don’t forget; you are not obliged to enter your genuine
year of birth. . . . . . .
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